A Fatal Collision: The Opioid Epidemic and the Dismantling of Child Protection Services in Washington State

by Marie Cohen

“B.B.” was born in 2022 and died of fentanyl poisoning in March 2023. During the ten years before B.B.’s death, DCYF had received 30 reports on B.B.’s family (many before B.B. was born) for issues including use of heroin, marijuana and alcohol in the home; lack of supervision of the children; domestic violence; an unsafe caregiver living with the family; an unsafe and unclean living environment unsecured guns in the home “out-of-control” behaviors by B.B.’s older siblings at school, with the mother described as “out-of-it” and unresponsive to school concerns; concerns about the children’s hygiene; and the mother driving under the influence of marijuana. An in-home services case that had been open since January 2023 was closed days before B.B.’s death. 

On August 24, 2024, the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) proudly announced in a press statement that it had reduced the number of children in out-of-home care by nearly half since 2018. Specifically, the number of children in foster care had fallen from 9,171 in 2018 to 4,971 as of August 14, 2024. “Outcomes like this demonstrate our agency’s commitment to keeping families together and children and youth safe,” DCYF Secretary Ross Hunter said. “Although the number of reports we are receiving remain [sic] consistent, we are seeing fewer children and youth in out-of-home care as families are being referred to support services rather than having children removed from their homes. Indeed, “safely reduce the number of children and youth in out of home care by half” (without a baseline date from which this can be measured) is one of DCYF’s six strategic priorities. But treating the decline in foster care (the direct result of government actions) as a desirable outcome in itself can contribute to a disregard of actual child welfare outcomes like safety and permanency.

How did DCYF reduce foster care by nearly 50 percent?

How did DCYF manage to slash its foster care rolls so radically in such a short time? Without providing specifics, the press release cites DCYF’s implementation of the Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) and its emphasis on “supporting and collaborating with families by providing access to services and programs.” A DCYF spokesperson told the Seattle Times that the department was using services to avoid removing children or to reunite families sooner, citing efforts to connect parents to substance use or mental health treatment programs, bring a social worker into the home to “problem solve,” or “offer practical items, like diapers, car seats and beds.”

Apparently not satisfied with the changes implemented by DCYF, the Washington legislature in 2021 passed the Keeping Families Together Act (KFTA, also known as HB 1227), which took effect on July 1, 2023. Among other provisions, KFTA increased the standard for the court to order removal of a child from the home, which previously required the agency to demonstrate that “reasonable grounds that the child’s “health safety or welfare will be seriously endangered if not taken into custody and that at least one of the grounds set forth demonstrates a risk of imminent harm to the child.” As amended by KFTA, the law now requires the agency to demonstrate “that removal is necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to the child due to child abuse or neglect.” The petition for removal is required to contain “a clear and specific statement as to the harm that will occur if the child remains in the care of the parent, guardian or custodian, and the facts that support the conclusion.” Moreover, the court must consider whether participation by the parents or guardians in “any prevention services” would eliminate the need for removal. If so, they must ask the parent whether they are willing to participate in such services and shall place the child with the parent if the parent agrees.

On a page dedicated to KFTA implementation, DCYF explains that it has implemented the law by adopting new policies and procedures to determine whether to remove a child and by training and supporting staff to implement the new procedures and determine whether there is an imminent risk of serious harm to the child. DCYF reports that internal reviews show that staff are “taking additional steps to prevent removal of a child and to support a safety plan for the family.” 

Shortly before KFTA took effect, DCYF, along with the Department of Health, the Health Care Authority, and the Washington State Hospital Association issued new guidelines to birthing hospitals and mandatory reporters. These guidelines stated that infants born substance exposed, but for whom there are no other safety concerns, can receive “voluntary wrap-around services from a community organization” without being reported to CPS. These voluntary services are being provided through federally-mandated “Plans of Safe Care (POSC).” Healthcare providers identifying a substance-exposed infant are instructed to access an online portal where they are directed  to call DCYF if safety concerns are identified and to complete a POSC referral if not.

DCYF has been issuing quarterly data updates to assess the impacts of the KFTA. According to the most recent (October 2024) update, the law is having the intended impact of further reducing removals to foster care. DCYF reports a 16 percent decrease in the number of children removed in the July through September quarter of 2024 compared to the same quarter of 2022, before passage of KFTA. However, comparing foster entries for all ages in July through September 2024 to those in the same quarter of the previous year, the data indicate that foster care entries actually increased! Will this be the beginning of the end of the foster care reductions? That remains to be seen.

A longer-term view raises questions about the difference KFTA made, compared to the previous and ongoing efforts by DCYF to reduce foster care placements.  Entries into foster care in Washington have decreased annually from 2017 to 2024, as shown in the chart below. The rate of decrease remained about the same between 2019 and 2024, while KFTA was not implemented until July 2023. Perhaps more children would have entered care if not for KFTA, but there is no way to assess the impact of KFTA as compared with DCYF’s ongoing effort to reduce removals. 

Source: DCYF, Child Welfare Agency Performance Dashboard, Children Entering Care in SFY, https://dcyf.wa.gov/practice/oiaa/agency-performance/reduce-out-of-home-care/cw-dashboard

The reduction in foster care placements was supposed to be accompanied (and made possible) by an increase in in-home services (which DCYF calls Family Voluntary Services or FVS), and DCYF reports that the number of cases receiving FVS increased by nine percent from 1,809 in SFY2023 to 1,994 in SFY2024. This increase in FVS cases cannot be compared to the 17-percent decrease in children placed in foster care over the same period, as the unit of analysis is different (families rather than children). But the key question is the nature and intensity of these services and whether they really kept the children safe. 

The cost of foster care reductions

The purpose of foster care is to keep children safe when they cannot be protected at home. So the essential question is whether the reduction in foster care placements has occurred without any cost to children. Trends in child fatalities and “near fatalities”1 due to child abuse or neglect can provide a clue. These deaths and serious injuries are the tip of the iceberg of abuse and neglect. For each child who dies or is seriously injured, there are many more that are living in fear, pain, or hunger, and incurring lifelong cognitive, emotional, and physical damage. There are troubling signs of an increase in child fatalities and near fatalities over the past several years. In its most recent quarterly update, DCYF reports on the number of “critical events” or child fatalities and near fatalities that met its criteria for receiving an “executive review.” These include the deaths of any minor that had been in DCYF custody or received services within a year of the death that were suspected to be caused by child abuse or neglect.2 They also include near fatality cases in which the child has been in the care of or received services from DCYF within three months preceding the near fatality or was the subject of an investigation for possible abuse or neglect. DCYF reports that the number critical events it reviewed increased from 23 in 2019 to 51 in 2023 and projects that it will increase to 61 in 2024.3

Source: DCYF, Keeping Families Together Act Quarterly Date Update, October 2024, https://dcyf.wa.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/DataUpdate_HB1227_October2024.pdf


The increase in critical events reflects, in part, the growing opioid crisis in Washington, as well as decisions Washington has made regarding how it intervenes to protect children.  Opioid related emergencies have “dramatically increased for the entire population (adults and children) in Washington,” and children have not been immune. Fentanyl is particularly dangerous to young children because it takes only a tiny amount to kill a baby or toddler, who can mistake the pills for candy or put straws or foil meant for smoking the drug in their mouths. The number of fatalities and near fatalities reviewed by DCYF that involved fentanyl climbed from four in 2019 to a projected 35 in 2024. Since 2018, Washington’s Office of the Family and Children’s Ombuds (has observed an annual increase in child fatalities and near fatalities involving accidental ingestions and overdoses. Fifty-seven (or 85 percent) of the 67 incidents examined in 2023 involved fentanyl. Over half of these incidents involved children under three years old and a shocking 14 out of the 85 infants were 12 months old or less.  As Dee Wilson and Toni Sebastian point out, the limited mobility and motor skills of infants suggests that some of these infants may have been given a small amount of fentanyl as a means of sedation.

The Washington Legislature was concerned enough about the possibility that KFTA is contributing to an increase in child fatalities and near fatalities in the context of the fentanyl epidemic that it passed a new law (SB 6109) in 2024. The law provides that a court must give “great weight” to the “lethality of high-potency synthetic opioids.….in determining whether removal is necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to the child due to child abuse or neglect.” However, it appears that there is confusion about exactly what that means.

Has DCYF given up on protecting children?

“We know that supporting and collaborating with families by providing access to services and programs increases their number of protective factors, leading to better outcomes,” said DCYF Assistant Secretary Natalie Green. “Giving families the tools they need to thrive and safely parent means more children and youth remain safely at home.”

DCYF, Washington Reduces the Number of Children in Out-Of-Home Care by Nearly Half, August 14, 2024.

But the work of DCYF’s own analysts, in their quarterly KFTA updates, raises doubts about whether DCYF is adequately performing its child protection function. These updates  acknowledge that the agency is not removing as many children with a high risk of future encounters with child welfare (in other words, those who have a high risk of being harmed). And they also report that the department has seen “an increasing percentage of moderately high to high risk cases being re-referred to CPS within 90 days of the risk assessment. DCYF also reports that the overlap between KFTA and Plan of Safe Care (POSC)  is resulting in fewer screened-in intakes involving substance-exposed newborns because these infants are now being referred to voluntary services under POSC.

There has been a chorus of voices alleging that DCYF is abdicating its child protection responsibilities. One foster parent told the Seattle Times that “she and other foster parents are finding children who now come into their care are in worse shape than they used to be, with more serious mental health conditions or greater exposure to lethal drugs like fentanyl.” She contends they’ve been left too long in unsafe conditions because of the heightened legal standard for removal. In The Erosion of Child Protection in Washington State, Toni Sebastian and Dee Wilson have cited the weakness of the management of Family Voluntary Services, which is often employed as an alternative to foster care. 

A survey of executive reviews of 2023 and 2024 child maltreatment child fatalities with DCYF involvement within a year provided examples of problems with screening, investigations, and case management, including the following:

  • Hotline issues. Reviews documented multiple intakes screened out on the same family even when the family had been the subject of multiple calls. The reviews also suggest that too many cases may be assigned to the Family Assessment Response (FAR) pathway, an alternative to a traditional investigation designed for lower-risk cases. In FAR cases, a social worker assesses the family and refers it to voluntary services. There is no finding about whether maltreatment has occurred and no child removal unless the case is transferred to the investigative track.
  • Premature closure of FAR cases. Reviewers noted instances in which FAR cases were closed after parents failed to cooperate, without caseworkers considering a transfer to the investigative track or before determining that the parent had followed through with services.
  • Assessment failures: Reviewers noted multiple failures to adequately assess parents for domestic violence, mental health, and substance abuse; failures to contact collaterals (relatives and friends) and instead relying on parental self-reports; lack of recognition of chronic maltreatment; ignoring evidence of past problems if not included in the current allegation; and failing to anticipate future behavior based on historical patterns.4
  • Inadequate understanding of substance abuse: Reviewers noted the failure to conduct a full assessment of substance abuse including history, behavioral observations, and collateral contacts; disregarding the unique danger to children posed by fentanyl; downplaying the significance of marijuana use, particularly as an indicator of relapse from harder drugs; and disregarding alcohol abuse because it is legal.
  • Failure to obtain information from treatment and service providers. The failure to communicate with service providers about clients’ participation in services like drug treatment and relying on clients’ self-reports was noted by more than one review team. Sometimes the providers refused to cooperate.  Staff told the team reviewing one case about a substance abuse treatment provider that routinely refuses to cooperate, even when parents sign release forms, and routinely tells clients not to cooperate with DCYF.
  • Lack of subject matter expertise. Reviewers pointed to the lack of deep knowledge about domestic violence, substance use disorder, and mental health among staff doing investigations, assessments, and case management and the need to provide access to subject matter experts when needed.
  • Failure to remove a child despite safety threats. The team reviewing the case of a four-year-old who died after ingesting fentanyl reported that there were at least two different times where an active safety threat was present that would have justified filing a petition in court to place the child in foster care. However, the staff believed, based on past experience, that the court would have denied the petition and therefore did not file. 
  • Delayed Reunifications: “P.L,.” a toddler allegedly beaten to death by his mother, was in foster care for over three years but his mother’s rights were never terminated. He was on a trial return to his mother for just over five months when he was found dead with bruises and burns all over his body. 

Staff shortages and high turnover were mentioned as contributing to the observed deficiencies in case practice in almost every fatality review. In B.B.’s case, the reviewers noted that the office had been functioning with a 50 percent vacancy rate for the last several years, stating that such a vacancy rate leads to high turnover, high caseloads, caseworkers with little experience, and supervisors forced to carry cases rather than support their caseworkers. Even caseloads that comply with state standards may be too high. The standard of 20 families per caseworker in FVS was noted to be unmanageable by one review panel, which noted that FVS cases are often discussed as high risk cases and require multiple contacts per month with family members, services providers, and safety plan participants. As Dee Wilson and Toni Sebastian put it,  “[b]etting young endangered children’s lives on in-home safety plans developed and implemented by inexperienced and overwhelmed caseworkers is reckless, ill-advised public policy.”

Conclusions and Recommendations

Treating the decline in foster care as a desirable outcome in itself, as Washington and other states have done, is both disingenuous and dangerous. Any government can slash the foster care rolls reducing or ending child removals, as many “child welfare abolitionists” recommend. The central purpose of child welfare services, including foster care, is to protect children from child abuse and neglect. A reduction in foster care placements that results in the failure to protect children is no kind of success. 

DCYF told King5 that “the increase in child fatalities and near fatalities in Washington is not being driven by the change in removal standards under House Bill 1227 or the reduction in the number of children in foster care. It is being driven by the increased availability of a highly addictive and hazardous drug and a lack of substance use disorder treatment in our communities.” But whether the agency’s policy or the drug epidemic is more at fault is not the right question. It is DCYF’s job to protect children given the circumstances that exist, including the drug epidemic and the lack of sufficient treatment, keeping in mind that treatment often does not work the first, second, third or subsequent times. 

What can be done? DCYF needs to address the workforce crisis, which will probably require increasing pay and improving working conditions, or even possibly relaxing requirements for employment as a caseworker in investigations, assessment, and FVS. DCYF should consider policy and practice changes such as reducing the FVS caseload cap from 20 cases per worker; Instituting a chronic neglect unit, with expert caseworkers and even lower caseloads, for chronic cases; finding a way to limit the use of FAR to cases that are truly low-risk; and promoting the use of dependency petitions for court supervision when children remain in the home, as suggested by two fatality review committees.5 DCYF should request and the legislature should fund a variety of ancillary services for families, starting with therapeutic childcare for all preschool aged children with FVS cases as well as those who have been reunited with their parents. Such childcare would give parents a break and parenting support, keep children safe for a large part of the day, and ensure another set of eyes on the child, among other benefits. Also needed are more residential drug treatment centers where parents can live with their children. 

Finally, more transparency is needed so that legislators, advocates and the public have access to the findings of DCYF’s executive review teams.  Washington deserves credit for sharing its executive child fatality reviews. But there is no reason that the DCYF should not share its near-fatality reviews as well. We know something about how DCYF failed B.B. and the other children who died. But the public needs access to the reviews of those children who narrowly escaped death as well as those who did not. It is only through such transparency that the public can see the actual impact of all the self-congratulatory proclamations about “safely reducing the number of children in out-of-home care.”

Notes

  1. A “near fatality” is defined by state law as “an act that, as certified by a physician, places the child in serious or critical condition.”
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  2. DCYF relies on the Office of the Family and Children’s Ombuds (OFCO) to determine whether the fatality appears to have been caused by abuse or neglect, therefore requiring DCYF to conduct a review.
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  3. Data collected by OFCO are more confusing. OFCO reviews all fatalities and near fatalities in which the child’s family was involved in Washington’s child welfare system within 12 months of the fatality. There number of near-fatalities reviewed by OCFO increased annually from 21 in 2018 to 70 in 2023, according to its most recent annual report on Child Fatalities and Near Fatalities in Washington State. But fatalities reviewed by OFCO did not show the same pattern. They reached a peak of 87 in 2018 and fell sharply in 2019, then rose yearly until they reached 85 in 2022 and then dropped to 79 in 2023. Nevertheless, adding fatalities and near fatalities together shows an alarming increase in critical incidents from 108 in 2018 to 149 in 2023.
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  4. For example, in the case of “R.W.,” a child who died at age four after ingesting fentanyl, an investigation was closed because the children were staying with relatives, despite the mother’s history of repeatedly removing the children from relatives with whom she had left them. A month later the child was found dead at a motel in the custody of the parents. 
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  5. See https://dcyf.wa.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/reports/mk-cfr-final-redacted.pdf and https://dcyf.wa.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/reports/ecfr-os-24.pdf ↩︎

School shootings and fentanyl overdoses: the uncounted costs of neglecting maltreated children

A fourteen-year-old boy and a fifteen-year-old girl are charged as adults, one for a mass shooting and the other for selling a fentanyl tablet that killed an older teenager. These two young people had something in common–a long history of neglect (and sometimes abuse) by their parents and a failure to intervene by child welfare services despite multiple reports that children were in danger. Ignoring chronically maltreated children when they could have been saved and then locking them up for life is both inhumane and costly. We must intervene to help maltreated children before they are irrevocably damaged by years of abuse and neglect.

On September 4, 2024, fourteen-year-old Colt Gray shot and killed two teachers and two students at Apalachee High School in Winder, Georgia with an AR-15 style rifle given to him by his father. He has been charged as an adult and is awaiting trial. It did not take long for the media to uncover that Colt had grown up in a chronically abusive and neglectful home. As the Washington Post put it in a devastating article, “Colt’s parents, each addicted to drugs and alcohol, were perpetually inattentive, often cruel and sometimes entirely absent, according to family members, neighbors, investigators, police reports and court records.” In November 2022, Colt’s mother, Marcee Gray, left his father, Colin Gray, and moved to southern Georgia with her two younger children. It appears that DCFS had opened a case at some point because In October of 2023, a spot drug-test revealed Marcee’s renewed drug use. Colin Gray was ordered to retrieve the other children, or they would be placed in foster care. Shortly thereafter, it appears that the case was closed.

There is no information from media reports about whether DCFS evaluated Colin Gray for his fitness to take care of his three children or to monitor their well-being in his care before closing the child welfare case. Yet, relatives reported to the New York Post that Colin Gray relentlessly bullied his son, calling him names like “sissy” and “bitch.” The Washington Post reported that Colt first came to the attention of authorities at the age of 11, when his school flagged him for searching the internet for ideas on how to kill his father. In Colin Gray’s custody, Colt never attended eighth grade and was not even registered for school until February 2 of that year. That Christmas, Colin Gray gave Colt his own AR-15 style rifle, in an attempt to “toughen him up,” as relatives told the New York Post. By his fourteenth birthday in January, Colt’s grandmother reported that he was searching the internet for what was wrong with him; she offered to pay for therapy and take him there but his father never signed him up. In July of 2023, Marcee returned from rehab and Colin allowed her to move back in. Colt’s mental health deteriorated even further after his mother’s return, and he talked of hurting himself or others. He registered for high school two weeks late and rarely attended. “Colt was like the thrown-away child,” said his grandmother, who tried in vain to get his father and the school to help him. Five days after his father failed to take him to a crisis mental health center despite his grandmother’s plea, Colt brought his rifle to school and took four lives.

Also charged as an adult was 15-year-old Maylia Sotelo of Green Bay, Wisconsin, the subject of a devastating article by Lizzie Presser of Pro Publica.  Maylia’s home had been a “hangout for users and dealers.” Her three older sisters had all been kicked out or left due to their mother’s violence. Maylia’s had been referred to child protective services 20 times before she was finally removed from her home at the age of 14. In a pattern typical of chronic maltreatment, the reports concerned multiple types of neglect, sexual abuse, and physical abuse. Before Maylia turned one, CPS documents show that her mother overdosed on cocaine and Adderall with seven children in her home. When she was five years old, a caller reported that her mother was “high as a kite” and her boyfriend was violent. The next year, another report indicated that there was no food in the home and that the mother was using heroin in front of her children.

When Malia was seven, CPS substantiated a report that a man “opened his pants, pulled out his penis and masturbated” in front of one of Maylia’s sisters. That same year, a woman overdosed on crack in the house and Maylia’s mother “would not call rescue or the police because [she] did not want her children removed,” according to a social worker’s notes. And a school employee reported that Maylia missed half the school year. When Maylia was 14 and her mother became psychotic, Maylia and her sister were finally removed from the home and placed with relatives. But they were given no counseling or assistance with school, according to Pro Publica. Maylia had been smoking weed since fifth grade, then began selling it. By the beginning of tenth grade, she was selling “blues,” pills that were billed as percocet but actually contained filler and fentanyl. She sold a pill to an 18-year-old named Jack McDonough. When he died of an overdose, Maylia was arrested for first-degree reckless homicide.

It is obvious that both Colt Gray and Maylia Sotelo were chronically maltreated children who suffered from multiple types of maltreatment over a period of years. It is also obvious that the systems designed to protect them failed both of these young people. Both families clearly required intervention that did not come when it was needed, though we do not have enough details to make an informed critique of the system’s response. When the child welfare system finally intervened in Malia’s case, it may have been hard to change her trajectory, and it appears that she was left with relatives and received monitoring or services to address her traumatic history. In Colt’s case, the intervention may have also come too late to prevent serious psychological damage. And once they became involved, caseworkers appeared to be focused on his mother and ended the case with the placement of all three children with their father, a parent who had been equally neglectful and failed to take action to protect the children from his wife’s abuse.

Perhaps more intensive in-home services provided earlier could have helped Colt’s and Maylia’s parents address the issues that led them to abuse or neglect their children. If not, perhaps Maylia’s earlier removal from her toxic home, and Colin’s removal to a better environment than either of his parents could provide might have saved these children from the sad fate that awaited them. The approach that is currently in fashion – exemplified by the much touted Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) of 2018 – prescribes the avoidance of foster care at almost any cost. It does, however, promise that parents receive support in parenting their children, whether it is mental health, drug treatment, or parenting training. Child welfare systems have long been providing such support to families in the form of in-home services, and FFPSA was supposed to provide the resources to improve these services. Unfortunately, FFPSA did not acknowledge or support the crucial role of frequent home visits to ensure the children are safe and that they can be removed into foster care if the parents do not cooperate with their plans for addressing their issues and improving their parenting.

Sadly, there is no evidence that increases in family support or child safety monitoring are forthcoming. States are proudly citing drops in their foster care caseloads, with no reporting on what is happening to the children left at home. States are not required to release data on the number of cases opened for in-home services, so we have no idea whether the abused and neglected children who are not being removed are getting any supervision or their parents receiving services. But as I have written, data from the states with the largest and third largest foster care caseloads indicates that the number of children receiving in-home services has not increased to make up for the drop in children removed to foster care; instead it has decreased along with foster care placements, resulting in a decline in the number of children being served overall.

Studies have documented the connection between child maltreatment and crime.1 Failing to intervene with at-risk children before they resort to crime and subsequently incarcerating them results in unnecessary human suffering, not to mention greater financial costs, than intervening early. If we do not want to remove more children, we must provide intensive services to parents and close monitoring of their children’s safety–and be ready to remove the children as soon as it becomes clear that parents are not going to change before the children are irreparably harmed. Such monitoring is key, because we really do not know what, if anything, works in preventing future maltreatment among parents who have maltreated their children.

This is not the first time that the failure of CPS has been noted in the wake of a heinous crime. I previously wrote about Lisa Montgomery, who was executed on January 12, 2021. She murdered a pregnant woman, cut out the baby, and took it home. It turned out that Lisa Montgomery had a long and horrific history of physical and sexual abuse throughout her childhood, including beatings and bizarre punishments by her mother, rape by her stepfather, and prostitution by both. Sadly, it seems that we have not made much progress since Lisa’s childhood, and current ideological trends run the risk of leaving even more children unprotected in the future.

Notes

  1. See Janet Currie and Erdal Tekin, Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? NBER Working Paper 12171, https://www.nber.org/digest/jan07/does-child-abuse-cause-crime and Todd I. Herrenkohl et al., Effects of Child Maltreatment, Cumulative Victimization Experiences, and Proximal Life Stress on Adult Crime and Antisocial Behavior, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250506.pdf.