Family First at five: Not much to celebrate

When the Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) passed as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, it was hailed by many as a revolutionary step in the history of U.S. child welfare. Five years after the Act took effect, child welfare leaders have been weighing in with statements like this one from Rebecca Jones Gaston, Commissioner of the Administration on Children, Youth and Families: “Following its passage five years ago, the Family First Prevention Services Act has transformed our approach to child welfare and benefited families across the many states that have used it to provide concrete support and services.”¹ But for those closer to ground-level and less invested in demonstrating the act’s success, there’s not much to celebrate.

FFPSA had two major goals: to keep children out of foster care altogether through services to families and to keep more of those who do have to enter care in family homes. In terms of the first goal, the law’s impacts on services to families have been almost negligible. And in its effort to keep foster children in families, FFPSA has exacerbated the critical shortage of appropriate placements for our most troubled youth, many of whom may need placements in larger settings. In this post, I examine these two goals and their outcomes in greater detail.

FFPSA’s Part I made it possible to allocate funds under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, previously directed mainly to foster care, to services aimed at keeping children out of care. The law allowed spending on mental health, substance abuse prevention and treatment, and in-home parenting services, “when the need of the child, such a parent, or such a caregiver for the services or programs are directly related to the safety, permanency, or well-being of the child or to preventing the child from entering foster care.”

As I explained in my 2019 post, Family First Act: a False Narrative, a Lack of Review, a Bad Law, Part I was based largely on the false premise that current law, by allowing TItle IV-E funds to pay for foster care and not for services to prevent it, incentivized states to remove children rather than keep families together. While it is true that IV-E funds were not available to pay for services to children and families in their homes, that does not mean that no money was available to help keep families together or that states had an incentive to place children in foster care. In fact, states had long been using Medicaid and other funds for services to prevent placement of children in foster care. In Federal Fiscal Year 2017, according to federal data, out of the children who received services after a CPS investigation or alternative response, only 201,680 were placed in foster care, while 1,332,254 (or more than five times as many children) received in-home services such as case management, family support, and family preservation services.²

Disregarding the role that other funding already played in child welfare, the framers of FFPSA required that Title IV-E would be the “payer of last resort,” so that any services already paid for by Medicaid could not be paid for by Family First. By doing this, they ensured that states with a generous Medicaid programs would be hard-pressed to find any service already existing in the state on which to spend their TItle IV-E money. If not for this provision, such states might have chosen to supplement Medicaid funding for some of these services. Perhaps some states would have allowed Title IV-E funds to be used to pay high-quality providers who do not accept Medicaid funding due to the program’s low reimbursement rates and high paperwork burden. (During my time as a foster care social worker in the District of Columbia, we had contracts with high-quality providers who did not accept Medicaid in order to provide therapy for our most complex clients).

The choice to fund only parenting, mental health and drug treatment services by the framers was another design flaw of FFPSA. The absence of a domestic violence service among the funded services is striking. It is universally acknowledged that drug abuse, mental illness and domestic violence are the “big three” factors that result in foster care placement. But for some reason, the words “domestic violence” are nowhere to be found in FFPSA. Perhaps even more striking is the failure to include one of the most promising services to prevent foster care–high-quality child care. As I have written, not only does quality early care and education prevent foster care placement through multiple pathways, but it also provides an extra set of eyes on the child in case of continued abuse or neglect–greatly needed if FFPSA is to achieve its goal of keeping children both safe and out of foster care. Think of what a difference Congress could have made by providing matching funds to provide quality child care to all families with in-home cases!

Perhaps the most unfortunate feature of FFPSA’s Part I is the requirement that all funds must be spent on “promising, supported or well-supported practices,” with 50 percent of the total spent spent on “well-supported practices” — a percentage that increases after 2026. The law imposes strict requirements for designating a program as promising, supported or well-supported. It set up a clearinghouse to assess the data on existing programs and approve those that met the criteria. As Dee Wilson points out in one of his essential commentaries, the law gets it exactly backwards. We have very little evidence about what works to prevent foster care placement. What we need is to invest in innovative approaches to doing this safely. But FFPSA prevents the use of TItle IV-E funds for this purpose.

Thanks to the various restrictions imposed by FFPSA, the clearinghouse is woefully incomplete. For example, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), the therapy of choice for depression and anxiety, which has not been approved nor is it on the list of programs to be examined by the clearinghouse. (“Trauma-Focused CBT,” a newer and much narrower and short-term model, has been approved.) No residential drug treatment program has been approved or is even slated to be considered. The requirement that the practice have a manual may be at fault for the failure to include CBT and residential drug treatment programs, but I’d like to hear from readers who may be better-informed. Buphenorphine therapy for opioid use disorder, which is often preferred to methadone therapy (which is approved by the clearinghouse)because it does not require daily clinic visits, has not been approved and is not slated for consideration, according to the Clearinghouse.. Of course, these popular programs are often funded by Medicaid anyway, so they would be ruled out by the last resort provision as well.

With all these restrictions on Title IV-E spending, it is not surprising that states have been hard-put to find useful ways to spend Title IV-E funds to keep families together. In an important article, Sean Hughes and Naomi Schaefer Riley cited the latest available federal data showing that just 6,200 children across the entire country received an FFPSA-funded service in FFY 2021, costing a grand total of $29 million. That is truly underwhelming given that about 600,000 children were found to be victims of maltreatment in FFY 2021.

The other major purpose of FFPSA was outlined in Part IV, entitled “Ensuring the Necessity of a Placement that is not in a Foster Family Home.” The purpose of this part was to keep more children out of “congregate care,” a term used to designate settings other than foster homes, such as group homes and residential treatment centers. FFPSA made it more difficult to place a child in a congregate placement by imposing conditions on Title IV-E reimbusement for such placements, and by limiting reimbursement after two weeks to facilities that qualify as “Quality Residential Treatment Programs (QRTP’s), a new category defined by the act. QRTP’s must meet strict criteria that many facilities that were caring for foster youth at the time of FFPSA’s passage could not meet without major changes. The act also (perhaps inadvertently) further restricted the number of congregate care beds available to foster youth by creating a conflict with a Medicaid provision called the “Institutions for Mental Diseases (IMD) exclusion” that prevents Medicaid paying the cost of care for children who are placed in facilities with more than 16 beds.“

Like Part I, Part IV of FFPSA was in large part based on a false narrative. The myth this time was that every child does better in a family rather than in a more institutional setting. But as I described here, there are many foster youths who cannot function in an ordinary foster home, at least until after a stay in a high-quality residential treatment program or group home. These are the same young people who bounce from home to home and end up in hotels, offices, jails, and other inappropriate settings, but FFPSA made no provision for them.

Even if too many children had been placed in residential care without sufficient clinical justification (which is probably the case in at least some states), it would not be responsible to shut down congregate care placements before ensuring that appropriate foster homes were available for all the children being displaced. But just as the deinstitution movement of the 1960s closed mental hospitals before putting alternatives in place, FFPSA disregarded the question of where children would go when congregate settings disappeared.

As I described here, FFPSA exacerbated trends that were already underway. Group homes and residential treatment centers were already shutting down due to growing publicity about abusive incidents at some facilities, failure of reimbursement rates to keep up with costs, and resignation of staff due to poor pay and working conditions. Tragically, this reduction in residential capacity coincided with increased demand for care due to the youth mental health crisis and increasing levels of need in the foster care population due at least in part to delays in removing children from abusive and neglectful homes. The restrictions put in place by FFPSA added to the problem. As Hughes and Schaefer Riley put it, “If you want to understand why foster children across the country are being housed in a range of inappropriate temporary settings, including county and state offices, hospitals, hotels and shelters, FFPSA is a significant factor.” 

The trends just mentioned have contributed to a foster care placement crisis that has if anything worsened since I described it last October. In Illinois, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is being sued by the Cook County Public Guardian for allowing foster children to remain locked up in juvenile detention even after they’ve been ordered released. In Maryland, a disability rights group has just filed suit against the Department of Human Services and other agencies for keeping foster children in hospitals and restrictive institutions beyond medical necessity for weeks, months, or even as long as a year. In a must-read article, Dee Wilson documents a 370 percent increase in hotel/office stays in his state of Washington since 2018 despite a federal court order to stop the practice. At an average cost of up $2,000 per night (including the cost of paying two social workers and a security guard), overnight hotel placements cannot possibly be cheaper than group homes or residential treatment centers. Similar problems are reported around the country, differing only in which inappropriate settings each state is relying on.

As is often the case, California paved the way for FFPSA by passing its Continuum of Care Reform, designed to curb the use of congregate placements, in 2015. A new article in the Los Angeles Times recounts the results. The number of children living in congregate care has dropped from 3,655 to 1,727 since implementation of the law, but the state has failed to find the foster homes to replace the congregate care settings. As a result, Los Angeles County has placed more than 200 foster youths in hotels, sometimes for months. County officials report that two social workers have been assaulted by foster youths in separate incidents this year at hotels. Moreover, it appears that care at the existing congregate facilities has grown worse as larger numbers of troubled youths are placed together in fewer facilities. The results of California’s reform and of FFPSA were predictable and indeed predicted by some commentators (including this writer), but these predictions were ignored.

As Dee Wilson puts it, “The implementation of Family First legislation has accelerated the demise of residential care, which has decreased 25% nationally during the past five years. It has been the goal of the federal Children’s Bureau and influential foundations to reduce the use of residential care (which has a bad reputation among advocates and most scholars) and they have succeeded; but without developing — or sometimes even proposing – viable alternatives.”

Anyone who chooses to celebrate the “revolution” wrought by FFPSA is living in a dream world. It’s time for Congress to recognize and correct the many errors it made in passing the law. At a minimum, Congress should add funding for early care and education and domestic violence programs to the models that can receive funding under Title IV-E, loosen the standards for evidence-based practices, modify the last-resort provision to allow payment for services to providers who do not accept Medicaid, eliminate some of the restrictions on congregate care, and provide incentives for states to boost their capacity of quality residential programs. Until such changes are made, there will be nothing to celebrate.

.

1. Alexia Suarez (asuarez@wearerally.com), [YOU’RE INVITED] Expert panel on the Family First Prevention Services Act. Email message, May 15, 2023.
2. These are duplicated counts as children are counted again each time they are the subject of an investigation and receive post-response services.